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I. INTRODUCTION
In Shelby County v. Holder, 'the State of Alabama challenged two
provisions of the Voting Rights Act ("Act") 2 that regulated voting laws at
the state level.3 Section Five of the Act required state and local govern-
ments with a history of voter discrimination to obtain preclearance from
the federal government before implementing changes to their voting
laws.4 Section Four sets forth a coverage formula to identify states that
would be subject to the preclearance requirement.5 In 2006, Congress
voted overwhelmingly to reauthorize the Act for another 25 years.6 The
Senate voted 98-0 in favor of re-authorization.7
Alabama challenged the constitutionality of Sections Four and Five
by arguing, among other things, that current incidents of voter discrimi-
nation were no worse than in states that were not subject to the preclear-
ance requirement.' In a 5-4 decision, despite Congress's overwhelming
support in favor of re-authorization, the Supreme Court invalidated
§ 4(b), with Justice Thomas arguing in a concurring opinion that he
would have invalidated both provisions.9 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Roberts held that the coverage formula was based on decades-old
evidence of state-specific voter discrimination and failed to consider Al-
abama's current record of voter discrimination when identifying states
that would be subject to the preclearance requirement.10 Surprisingly,
the Court afforded no deference to Congress, despite the fact that an
1. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §1973 (1965) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301).
3. Shelby Cty.,133 S. Ct. at 2615.
4. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).
5. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2615.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013) (No. 12-96), 2013 WL 823229, at *15-16 ("Current conditions differ dramatically
from those Congress confronted in 1975 just 10 years after passage of the VRA. At that
time, '[s]ignificant disparity persisted between the percentages of whites and Negroes
registered in at least several of the covered jurisdictions."').
9. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
10. See id. (stating that "[o]ur country has changed, and while any racial discrimina-
tion in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy
that problem speaks to current conditions").
[Vol. 120:3
RIGHTS WITHOUT REMEDIES
overwhelming number of legislators voted for the Act's re-
authorization.11
In National Federation of Independent Investors v. Sebelius,12 how-
ever, deference to Congress was on full display when the Court upheld
the Affordable Health Care Act's individual mandate.13 Again writing
for a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that "[p]roper re-
spect for a coordinate branch of the government requires that we strike
down an Act of Congress only if the lack of constitutional authority to
pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated."
' 14
How can the Court's holding in Shelby County-in which not a sin-
gle senator voted against re-authorization--be reconciled with the
Court's reasoning in Sebelius, which involved a law that deeply divided
Congress? The distinguishing factor in Shelby County was the Court's
belief that the legislative process could not adequately confront this is-
sue.15 As Justice Scalia stated during oral argument, members of Con-
gress may have been reticent to vote against the Act's re-authorization
because of the political fallout that such a vote would engender: 16 Justice
Scalia stated as follows:
I don't think there is anything to be gained by any Senator to vote
against continuation of this act. And I am fairly confident it will be
reenacted in perpetuity unless-unless a court can say it does not
comport with the Constitution... It's-it's a concern that this is not
the kind of a question you can leave to Congress. There are certain
districts in the House that are black districts by law just about now.
And even the Virginia Senators, they have no interest in voting
against this. The State government is not their government, and they
are going to lose- -they are going to lose votes if they do not reenact
11. See id. (invalidating the Act while noting that "[s]triking down an Act of Con-
gress 'is the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform' (quot-
ing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring))).
12. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
13. See id. at 2608 (finding that "it is reasonable to construe what Congress has done
as increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go
without health insurance").
14. Id. at 2579 (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)) (internal
citations omitted). Chief Justice Roberts rejected the argument that the individual man-
date was permissible under the Commerce Clause, but found that the mandate was valid
under the Taxing and Spending Clause. See U.S. CONST., art. I., § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.").
15 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S.




PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
the Voting Rights Act. Even the name of it is wonderful: The Voting.,
Rights Act. Who is going to vote against that in the future?
17
Simply put, political pressures made it difficult, if not impossible,
for the legislature to pass corrective legislation. In these circumstances,
judicial intervention is necessary-no matter how lopsided the vote. The
Court's decision is not anomalous: federal courts have often intervened
to decide legal issues where political considerations make it difficult, if
not impossible, for Congress or the Executive Branch to remedy cog-
nizable legal harms.'8
Thus, although "great social and political problems [are bet-
ter] resolved in the political arena,"19 there are some issues that "at times
seem to defy such resolution.2 ° In Shelby County, the Court intervened
precisely because "the executive and legislative branches [were] para-
lyzed by concern over their own tenure and individual careers."'21 The
Court should do the same when confronted with laws that infringe on the
constitutional rights of citizens' who are politically powerless and de-
pend on the courts to provide redress for arbitrary legislation. Put differ-
ently, the Court's decision in Shelby County can-and should-have
lasting implications for a doctrine that was not even at issue: Article IIl
standing.22 In situations where elected representatives are unable or un-
willing to resolve matters that, among other things, implicate fundamen-
tal constitutional rights, the Court should intervene to protect citizens
who lack recourse through the legislative process. As one court ex-
plained, "the judiciary must bear a hand and accept its responsibility to
assist in the solution where constitutional rights hang in the balance.23
The Court's current standing doctrine, nonetheless, leaves citizens
vulnerable to the arbitrary actions (or inactions) of government. The
Court has interpreted the "case or controversy" requirement in Article
III to bar litigants from challenging laws unless they have suffered a con-
crete injury ("injury in fact") that is caused by the law in question and
17. See id. (emphasis added)
18. See, e.g., Derek Funk, Comment, Checking the Balances' An Examination of
Separation of Powers Issues Raised By the Windsor Case, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1471, 1489
(2013) (stating that "[b]ecause Congress's main checking power is "the power to legis-
late," Congressional refusal (or inability) to assert itself as the primary policy maker in-
vites the executive and judicial branches to expand their spheres of influence
at Congress's expense").
19. Jeffrey H. Bowman, Slow Dance on the Killing Field When Justices Fail to Dis-
pense Justice, 32-JUL ARiz. ATT'Y 20, 35 (1996) (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967)) (alternation in original).
20. Id. (quoting Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 517).
21. Id.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.




redressable through the judicial process.24 These requirements strive to
ensure that the judiciary avoids interfering in matters that are properly
left to Congress and the democratic process.25 As Justice Scalia explains,
"standing is a crucial and inseparable element of [separation of powers]
whose disregard will inevitably produce-as it has during the past few
decades-an overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance.,
26
However, in some circumstances, elected representatives "prevent
action... to serve their own political interests,"27 and lack the political
will to confront laws that result in cognizable legal harm.28 In addition,
elected representatives may employ techniques, such as racial gerryman-
dering, to entrench power and marginalize the voices of dissenting
24. See Emily A. Berger, Comment, Standing at the Edge of a New Millennium:
Ending a Decade of Erosion of the Citizen Suit Provisions of the Clean Water Act, 59
MD. L. REv. 1371, 1377 (2000) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. ,of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)); see also Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Politi-
cal Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REv. 303, 304 (1996). Professor Simard states:
Since the mid-1970s, however, the Court's attitude toward
the standing doctrine has been increasingly restrictive. In a string of cases de-
cided in the mid-1970s, the Court held that, to meet the requirements
of standing, a litigant had to prove not only that she suffered an injury in fact,
but also that her injury was caused by the defendant's conduct and could be re-
dressed by the court ... the adoption of the causation and redressability ele-
ments and the incorporation of separation of powers principles have broadened
the reach of standing and made judicial review more restrictive.
Id.
25. See, e.g., William Marks, Note, Bond, Buckley, and the Boundaries of Separa-
tion of Powers Standing, 67 VAND. L. REv. 505, 510 (2014) (noting that "stand-
ing 'relates in part.., to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous
and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an une-
lected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government"' (quoting Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring))).
26. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881 (1983); see also Erik R. Zimmerman,
Supplemental Standing for Severability, 109 Nw. U. L. REv. 285, 293 (2015). The stand-
ing doctrine is focused heavily on the concreteness of the alleged harm:
[S]tanding doctrine is supposed to promote sound judicial decisions. The theo-
ry is that courts are best at deciding the types of concrete disputes that have tra-
ditionally been viewed as "cases" or "controversies." Courts also rely heavily
on the presentations of the parties in the adversary system, and the injury in fact
and causation requirements help to ensure that the parties have a sufficient
stake in a dispute to frame the issues properly for the court.
Id. at 294.
27. Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote: Judicial Review of Arbitrary Legisla-
tive Inaction, 87 S. CAL. L. REv. 1435, 1446 (2014).
28 See id. at 1446-47.
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groups.29 Whether through action or inaction, legislators can make it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for politically powerless groups to effectuate
change through the democratic process, which exposes many citizens to
continuous, non-redressable harm.30 Applying the standing doctrine in
light of these realities concentrates, rather than separates, power at the
federal level, and provides "a shield to allow the executive to violate the
law, free from judicial scrutiny."'', For this reason, judicial intervention
is necessary both to protect individual liberty and to ensure that the
courts do not "close their doors to individuals seeking justice.3 2 Other-
wise, citizens are left with rights but no remedies.
This article proposes that Article III standing should be conferred
on a distinct class of litigants who can demonstrate the following:
1. The challenged law results in harm that cannot be addressed
through the democratic and legislative process, and in-
29. See Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial
and Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1545
(1994). Political and racial gerrymandering are widely seen as a way that the dominant
political parties advance their interests:
Political gerrymandering by its very nature is a partisan issue, but racial gerry-
mandering has ties to partisan politics as well. Both types of gerrymandering
are used by the major political parties to advance their own interests. While ra-
cial gerrymandering has reasons behind it other than political ones, the mar-
riage of gerrymandering and partisan politics is one of the most crucial issues
involved in the debate over the propriety of using the gerrymander to rig elec-
tion results. As a basic proposition, racial gerrymandering favors the Republi-
can Party, and political gerrymandering favors the Democratic Party. This has
produced some very strange bedfellows.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The
Counter-Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 665-66 (2008). One study on the effec-
tiveness of democracy concluded as follows:
[The] privileged participate more than others and are increasingly well orga-
nized to press their demands on government. Public officials, in turn, are much
more responsive to the privileged than to average citizens and the least affluent.
Citizens with lower or moderate incomes speak with a whisper that is lost on
the ears of inattentive government officials, while the advantaged roar with a
clarity and consistency that policy-makers readily hear and routinely follow.
Id.
31. Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Federalism and the Challenges of State Constitu-
tional Contestation, 115 PENN ST. L. REv. 983, 1004 (2011).
32. Bowman, supra note 19, at 41 (quoting J. Skelly Wright, No Matter How Small,
58 MAss. L.Q. 9, 11 (1973)); see also, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79
(2003) (invalidating a law banning sodomy between same-sex couples).
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volves an area that is not within Congress's enumerated
powers;
2. A prima facie showing that the law facially violates a fun-
damental constitutional right;33 and
3. The alleged harm can be addressed by the Court in a man-
ner that results in workable rules to guide lower courts, leg-
islators, and other agencies of government.
Under the third prong, the Court would consider factors such as
whether: (1) a litigant states a cognizable legal claim involving viola-
tions of a protected constitutional right; (2) the litigant is within the class
of individuals that will suffer harm absent a legal remedy, (3) the harm is
sufficiently direct in that it has already occurred or is reasonably likely to
occur; (4) the issue presented is a question of law, is not within Con-
gress's enumerated powers, and can be decided through the interpretation
of legal texts.
Part II discusses the history and evolution of the standing doctrine
and argues that the Court's jurisprudence has unwisely restrained the ju-
diciary's ability to adjudicate constitutional questions where the coordi-
nate branches, as a practical matter, cannot. Part III proposes a new
standing framework that would broaden and narrow the class of litigants
that could bring suit, while simultaneously respecting separation-of-
powers principles by applying the abstention and political question doc-
trines.34 Part III concludes by arguing that the standing doctrine should
33. See generally, Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEo. L.J. 317, 350-51
(2004). Professor Siegel summarizes the "zone of interest" as follows:
The requirement that a plaintiff be an intended beneficiary of le-
gal requirements that he or she invokes also finds echoes in ordinary common
law doctrines. For example, a violation of a contract may injure someone who
is not a party to the contract. But such a person, even though injured, may not
have a right to sue to enforce the contract; the person's right to sue turns on
whether the person is an "intended" beneficiary of the contract or a mere "inci-
dental" beneficiary. Similarly, a person who is injured as the result of
a statutory violation may attempt to recover by bringing an ordinary tort action,
but whether a court will determine that the statutory violation constitutes negli-
gent conduct will turn on whether the statute was intended to protect persons
like the plaintiff from the kind of harm that resulted from the statute's violation.
Id. at 351.
34. See Tracy Rottner Yu, Note, "Standing" in a Quagmire: Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.
Ct. 2312 (1997), 67 U. CN. L. REv. 639, 648-49 (1999) (noting that judicial review is not
appropriate where there exists a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
2016]
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not be applied where the purposes underlying its application are not fur-
thered, and where the practical result leaves citizens with abstract, not
concrete rights.
II. ARTICLE III STANDING
Article III of the United States Constitution limits judicial review to
"cases and controversies," although it does not establish threshold re-
quirements that litigants must satisfy to have standing in the federal
courts.35 Importantly, the standing doctrine is not rooted in Article III,
but instead has evolved over the years through the Court's jurispru-
dence.36 The doctrine consists of (1) constitutional; and (2) prudential
standing,37both of which have been used to restrict citizens' access to the
courts.38
the issue to a coordinate political department" (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1986))).
35. See U.S. CONST., art. I1, §2, cl. 1. Article III provides in relevant part as fol-
lows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to contro-
versies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the Cit-
izens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
36 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. L. REv. 417, 419-21
(2013) (discussing the development of the standing doctrine).
37. See Kelly Knoll, Note, Confusion Likely: Standing Requirements for Legal Rep-
resentatives Under the Lanham Act, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 993-94 (2015)
("[Ojur standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces
the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement; and prudential standing, which em-
bodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.") (internal
quotations omitted).
38' See Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing,
and the Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REv. 377, 425 (2009) ("While the Court has not re-
peated this extra-constitutional rationale for limited standing, one cannot help get the
sense that docket control in the broad sense of the term is part of the judicial reluctance to




Although the standing doctrine has existed for many years, the
Court's interpretation of standing has evolved significantly.39 For many
years, federal courts resolved standing issues based not upon the thresh-
old question of justiciability, but on the merits of a litigant's case.4
0 As a
result, litigants asserting a cognizable legal claim, whether rooted in
common law or statute, had standing to challenge a law or seek recovery
for cognizable legal harms.41
However, in the New Deal era, "the desire for a 'more pervasive
constitutional oversight' of administrative authority,,42 and the advent of
"more 'ethereal claims' than those at common law ... led federal courts
to entertain cases without looking to the sort of legal interest sufficient to
support a traditional cause of action. '43 These developments led courts
to view standing independently from the merits,44 which severed "the
connection between standing and the [underlying] cause of 
action.4 5
This development enabled the Court to "broaden the role of federal
courts as well as to restrict it,"' 46 and subsequent decisions confirmed that
the Court viewed the standing doctrine as a way to "limit the use of the
federal courts to attack regulation.47 In Ass 'n of Data Processing Ser-
39. See Craig A. Stem, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance
Fail a Constitutional or A Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue, 12 LEwis &
CLARK L. REv. 1169, 1176 (2008).
40. See id. (stating that "standing was not so much a matter of the constitutional lim-
its upon what cases were justiciable; it was rather a matter of the merits of the claim").
Standing also "requires that claimants of statutory or constitutional rights arguably be
within the zone-of-interest created by the cited statutory or constitutional provision." Id.
at 1199-2000.
41. See id. at 1174. One commentator summarizes the evolution of the standing
doctrine as follows:
For most of American history under the Constitution, standing was simply a
question of whether a plaintiff had a cause of action, testing thereby the relation
of the party to meritorious claims .... Standing existed for the party with a le-
gal interest or legal right to lay before the court, an interest or right granted or
secured by common law, Constitution, or statute. Standing, then, fundamental-
ly entailed no inquiry apart from the merits.
Id. at 1176.
42. Id. at 1177 (quoting Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article
IIl, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1915, 1920-21 (1986)).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1178.
45. Id. at 1179.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1178; see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 148-74 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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vice Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,48 the Court held that suits could only
be brought by litigants who suffered an injury-in-fact, not merely those
who had a legal interest in the outcome.49 This required a litigant to suf-
fer a "concrete and particularized"50 injury amounting to "personal and
tangible harm,"'" and to be within "the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.52
Additionally, in some cases, the Court "insisted upon 'judicially cog-
nizable injury' rather than simply any injury-in-fact,"53 meaning that the
injury must result from "a violation of legal right triggering a judicial
remedy."
54
Accordingly, litigants cannot base injuries-in-fact on "a disagree-
ment, however sharp and acrimonious,,55 or on harm that is speculative,
indirect, or conjectural.5 6 Furthermore, injuries-in-fact are not present
where a litigant seeks adjudication of a question better suited to resolu-
48. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
49. See id. at 158, 153 n.1,158.
50. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also Ryan Guilds,
Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal
Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1867 (1996). In Lujan, Justice Kennedy stated:
While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the chal-
lenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a
concrete and personal way. This requirement is not just an empty formality. It
preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both that the parties
before the court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the outcome,
and that the legal questions presented... will be resolved, not in the rarified
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to
a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581.
51. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013); see also Stem, supra note
39, at 1180.
When the common law cause of action defined standing, standing allowed ac-
cess to the court to anyone with a legal interest to vindicate, an interest that had
suffered some injury. Such injury is known as a legal wrong because it was in-
jury for which the law granted a remedy. But injury might be taken to mean
something else. It might mean harm, some setback or hurt, apart from whether
that harm triggers a cause of action, a remedy at law. To decide
that standing could be satisfied by such harm, an injury-in-fact, would signifi-
cantly enlarge standing beyond the test of legal interest.
Id.
52. Ass'n of Data Process Serv. Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 153.
53. Stem, supra note 39, at 1184.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)).
56. See Elizabeth T. Isaacs, Comment, Exposure Without Redress: A Proposed Re-
medial Tool for the Victims Who Were Set Aside, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 519, 523-25 (2015).
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tion by the legislature,7 advisory opinions, or "if subsequent events
make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur."59 Moreover, a subjective allegation
that a law chills constitutionally protected conduct is not an "ade-
quate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat
of specific future harm."6 Finally, a litigant must also show that the de-




The Court also relies on pragmatic considerations to restrict access
to courts. One of the most common-and widely debated-limitations is
the generalized grievance doctrine.62 This doctrine blocks litigants from
bringing suit where the alleged injury "is plainly undifferentiated and
'common to all members of the public."' 63  Instead, citizens must
demonstrate that they have "sustained or [are] immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of [executive or legislative] ac-
tion,"64 which requires more than "merely a general interest common to
all members of the public., 65 Thus, as the number of citizens who are
57. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
58. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (stating that "it is quite clear that 'the
oldest and most consistent hread in the federal law of justiciability is that the federal
courts will not give advisory opinions' (quoting C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 34
(1963))).
59. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
170 (2000).
60. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
61. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (stating that the injury
must be "fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a fa-
vorable judicial decision"); see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (holding that a liti-
gant "must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury ... and
that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury"); Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (holding that "the standing Article III requires
must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons ap-
pearing in courts of first instance").
62. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (describing the "generalized
grievance" doctrine); see also Alex Hemmer, Note, Civil Servant Suits, 124 YALE L. J.
758, 784 (2014) (stating that "[b]oth the nature of this rule and its exact metes and
bounds are far from clear").
63. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992) (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974)).
64. Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937) (per curiam).
65. Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221,
238-40 (2008) (discussing the generalized grievance doctrine and stating that that "cer-
tain wrongful government action-such as that which 'affects "all who breathe"'-will
get its fair consideration, but only 'in the normal political process,' not in the courts");
see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. In Lujan, the Court stated'as follows:
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injured by a law increases, the likelihood of challenging that law de-
creases.
66
In a number of cases, the Court has applied the generalized griev-
ance doctrine to reject "citizen-standing," which is based on citizens' as-
serted right to "require that the Government be administered according to
law and that the public moneys be not wasted.,67 For example, litigants
may not challenge "the generic validity of a constitutional amendment in
court.,68 Likewise, citizens may not sue in their capacity as taxpayers
because the "interest in the moneys of the Treasury... is shared with
millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and...
is essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern.,69
However, the Court has permitted litigants to bring suit in various
contexts where standing might not otherwise exist-and where the Court
could have applied the generalized grievance doctrine to preclude liti-
gants from bringing suit.70 The doctrinal inconsistencies in the Court's
standing jurisprudence demonstrate that a departure from traditional
standing requirements in a discrete class of cases is necessary and war-
ranted.
C. Context-Specific Standing
In several cases, the Court applies the traditional standing require-
ments differently depending on the nature and type of the alleged harm.
For example, the Court has held that litigants have standing despite pro-
spective harm, including where: (1) a law "chills" constitutionally pro-
tected conduct; (2) there exists an objectively reasonable fear of future
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only
a generally available grievance about government-claiming only harm to his
and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does
the public at large--does not state an Article HI case or controversy.
Id; see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (stating that a litigant "must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties"); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).
66. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REv. 459, 508
(2008) (noting that "mere numerosity creates a standing problem"); but see Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (holding that standing can, in some circum-
stances, be found where an injury "is concrete, though widely shared" (citing Pub. Citi-
zen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989))).
67. Brown, supra note 65, at 239-40 (stating thatCitizens have no standing to sue
based "merely [on] concern over whether the executive branch is adhering to the law").
68. Id. at 240 (citing Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922)).
69. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
70 See generally Guilds, supra note 50 (explaining generally the effect of the gen-
eralized grievance doctrine on litigants' ability to access the courts).
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harm; (3) a litigant is within the class of individuals harmed by the chal-
lenged law; and (4) redress through the legislature is not available.7'
1. Standing Despite Prospective Harm
a. Prospective Harm from Laws that "Chill" Constitutionally-
Protected Conduct
In a limited number of cases, the Court has found standing based on
the fact that a law "chills" constitutionally protected conduct. In Laird v.
Tatum,72 the Court held that "constitutional violations may arise from the
deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of governmental regulations that fall short
of a direct prohibition against he exercise of First Amendment rights. -
73
In such cases, the challenged law was "regulatory, proscriptive, or com-
pulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospec-
tively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he
was challenging.,74 Accordingly, where a citizen's conduct is "regulat-
ed, constrained, or compelled directly by the government's actions, in-
stead of by his or her own subjective chill, 75 standing to sue suit likely
exists. Consequently, the injury-in-fact requirement was satisfied despite
the fact that the alleged harm was neither immediate nor strictly personal,
as the litigant was merely within the class of individuals who were cur-
rently or prospectively would be harmed by the law. As a result, Laird
suggests that the Court may place less emphasis on the immediacy of the
harm where the law infringes settled constitutional rights.
b. Injury-in-Fact Based on Objectively Reasonable Fear of Harm
In some cases, reasonable fear of anticipated harm can be a suffi-
cient to find an injury-in-fact.76 A plaintiff need only show a "well-
founded or reasonable fear of prosecution under the statute to meet the
injury prong of a standing analysis.77 For example, in Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers National Union,78 the Court held that allegations of "an
71 See, e.g., Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir.
1981), overruled on other grounds by Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
72. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, (1972).
73. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 661 (1977).
76. See Brian Calabrese, Note, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing Injury-in-Fact, 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445, 1460 (2011) (stating that "[flear also has a role in an injury-
in-fact analysis for standing in pre-enforcement challenges to the constitutionality of stat-
utes").
77. Id.
78. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979)
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intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a con-
stitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible
threat of prosecution thereunder," are sufficient to confer standing.79
Additionally, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,80 the Court concluded that
"[c]ognizable injury-in-fact exists when there is reasonable fear and ob-
jective evidence that supports the existence of this fear.",81 Similarly, in
Massachusetts v. EPA,82 the Court held that the plaintiffs (state and local
governments) had standing to challenge the Environmental Protection
Agency's denial of a petition that advocated for a rule regulating the
emissions of carbon monoxide and greenhouse gases.8 3 The majority in
Massachusetts found that, although the alleged harm "hints at the envi-
ronmental damage yet to come,84 it resulted from concerns regarding
climate change, which "are serious and well recognized.,
85
The Court's holdings support the proposition that "harm can be
cognizable when it begins to be feared, even if this occurs before it is
imminent,,86 and can be predicated on inaction by the government, par-
ticularly where redressability through the political process is not possi-
79. Id. at 298; see also Calabrese, supra note 76, at 1461 (discussing Babbitt, in
which the Court held that a litigant "should not be required to undergo criminal prosecu-
tion as the sole means of seeking relief') (internal citations and quotations omitted); see
also Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14.
80. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
81. Calabrese, supra note 76, at 1471.
82. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
83. See id. at 526.
84. Id. at 521-22 (finding that, because Massachusetts "owns a substantial portion of
the state's coastal property ... it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a
landowner").
85. Id. at 521 (holding that the EPA's denial, and the effects of climate change, had
"already inflicted significant harms, including 'the global retreat of mountain glaciers,
reduction in snow-cover extent ... [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during
the 20th century relative to the past few thousand years"') (internal citations omitted); see
also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
688-90 (1973) (conferring standing on private plaintiffs for "economic, recreational
and aesthetic harm[s]" even though the harm followed an "attenuated line of causation");
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000) (ex-
plaining that "nothing was 'improbable' about the proposition that a company's continu-
ous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river would cause nearby resi-
dents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway and would subject them to other
economic and aesthetic harms"); John Treangen, Note, Standing: Closing the Doors of
Judicial Review Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 36 S.D. L. REv. 136, 149 (1991).
86. Calabrese, supra note 76, at 1464-65 (stating that fear-based harm is an "excep-
tion carved out of the general imminent threat rule"); but see Mark Seidenfeld & Allie
Akre, Standing in the Wake of Statutes, 57 ARiz. L. REV. 745, 769-70 (2015) (criticizing
the Court's "fuzzy reasonableness analysis, which is subjective in nature and gives little
direction to lower courts," and arguing that the Court should examine whether the statuto-




ble. In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,88  Justice Breyer echoed
these sentiments, stating that "a threat of future harm may be realistic
even where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times, dates, and GPS co-
ordinates. 89 Justice Breyer relied on the Court's holding in Massachu-
setts, even though the alleged harm resulting from the failure to regulate
carbon monoxide and greenhouse gases "might not occur for several
decades."'9 In other words, an alleged harm is not speculative or lacking
concreteness merely because such harm may occur in the future.91
2. Process-Based Harms
In a few contexts, litigants may have standing despite the relatively
generalized nature of the harm and their inability to prove that, but for
the alleged harm, the litigants would have received a benefit.92 In the af-
firmative action context, individuals can have standing without showing
that they "would have obtained the benefit in question-a place in a
medical school class or a government contract--but for the denial of
equal protection."93
These decisions adopt a broader view of injury-in-fact that stems
from "unequal competition or from unequal selection' 94 and embraces
the notion that "classification as a conceptual process is itself a harm."95
87 Teter, supra note 27, at 1445-46 (stating that "arbitrary congression-
al inaction poses the same problems as arbitrary action").
88. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
89. Id. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 505 ("[W]here, as here, a plaintiff has already been subject to the inju-
ry it wishes to challenge, the Court has asked whether there is a realistic likelihood that
the challenged future conduct will, in fact, recur and harm the plaintiff."); see also Brad-
ford C. Mank, Judge Posner's 'Practical' Theory of Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer's
Approach to Standing Than to Justice Scalia's, 50 Hous. L. REv. 71, 117-18 (2012).
92 See, e.g., David Flickinger, Note, Standing in Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 49
STAN. L. REv. 381, 396 (1997) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995)); Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jackson-
ville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81
n.14 (1978).
93. Flickinger, supra note 92; at 381.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 396 n.84 (emphasis added) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Pri-
vatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1465 (1988)). Professor Flickinger
explains as follows:
Neither line of cases concludes that classification is the harm, and neither has to
do so. In the set-aside cases, discernible individuals are unable to compete on
an equal basis for contracts; in the jury cases, individual jurors are removed
from the venire by peremptory challenges. But as we have seen, no individual
in the voting rights context is denied anything available to any other individual.
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In the Sixth Amendment context, for example, the Court has found
standing based solely on the allegation that the state engaged in discrim-
ination when selecting a jury.96 An important limitation in such cases is
that the litigant must be within the class of individuals who are or would
be harmed by the challenged law.97 More importantly, these decisions
demonstrate that the Court occasionally adopts a process-based view of
standing and relies on the improper classification of groups as the source
of an injury-in-fact. By not requiring litigants to show that they would
have achieved a benefit absent the unconstitutional conduct-even in the
face of relatively generalized harms-the Court adopted an abstract view
of an injury-in-fact based on the mere existence of a constitutional viola-
tion.
3. Remedial (Equitable) Discretion
Some courts have relied on the "equitable discretion" doctrine to
confer standing when redress through the legislature is unavailable. In
Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee,98 the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia held that "[w]hen a congressional plaintiff
brings a suit involving circumstances in which legislative redress is not
available or a private plaintiff would likely not qualify for standing, the
court would be counseled... to hear the case."99 Likewise, in Vander
Jagt, the Court conferred standing on four Republican members of the
House of Representatives because "the Democratic House leadership
ha[d] successfully diluted the political power of Republican representa-
tives, their voters, and residents of their districts."' 0° In so holding, the
Court emphasized that "our nation-with surprising consensus-has relied
The whole point of Shaw I, its innovation over the vote dilution cases, is that
no individual must personally show the denial of equal treatment ....
Id. at 396.
96. See id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986)); see also City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 114, 122-23 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that standing "has always depended on whether a plaintiff has a 'personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy,' not on the 'precise nature of the relief sought"') (internal
citations omitted).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739 (1995) (denying standing in a
redistricting case because they [the plaintiffs] did not live "in the district that [was] the
primary focus of their racial gerrymandering claim, and... [did] not otherwise demon-
strate that they, personally, ha[d] been subjected to a racial classification").
98. Reigle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873,882 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
99. Id. (emphasis added); see also Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-
Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the Framers'Intent, and the Judiciary's Role, 100 DICK.
L. REv. 341, 367 (1996).
100. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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on the judiciary to remedy longstanding flaws in the political system
which impede equal participation in the governmental process."' ' 1
As such, elected representatives can have standing if their claims
present "a cognizable, common law harm to a protected legal interest."
1'0 2
Likewise, in Massachusetts, which involved climate change, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because "the global warming
issue is fraught with free-rider problems, making resort to
the political branches problematic."'1 °3
D. The Current Status of the Standing Doctrine
As discussed below, the standing doctrine lacks cohesion, under-
mines, rather than furthers, separation-of-powers principles, and in some
situations leaves politically powerless groups unable to enforce constitu-
tional rights.
1. The Lack of Cohesive Standing Rules
The Court has acknowledged that the standing doctrine "cannot be
reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition."'104 In fact, schol-
ars have criticized the doctrine as "confused,"' 0 5 and "neither obvious
nor reducible to a clear and concise statement.10 6 For example, in the
taxpayer standing context, the Court's decisions have been described as
"border[ing] on gibberish."' 0 7 Others have argued that "there is no ob-
jective scale by which to measure whether a particular kind of injury is




102. David Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV.
205, 217 (2001).
103. Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 66, at 512 (emphasis added) (dis-
cussing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). Chief Justice Roberts dissented,
arguing that "[t]he very concept of global warming seems inconsistent with this particu-
larization requirement. Global warming is a phenomenon "harmful to humanity at large,"
and that "the redress petitioners seek is focused no more on them than on the public gen-
erally-it is literally to change the atmosphere around the world." Massachusetts, 549
U.S. at 540-41.
104. Richard Albert, The Constitutional Politics of the Establishment Clause, 87 CH.-
KENT L. REV. 867, 878 (2012) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,475 (1982)).
105. Id. (quoting Michael Abramowicz, Beyong Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth
Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 607 (1997).
106. Id.; see also Steven D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the Constitution, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 365, 370 (2006).
107. Albert, supra note 104, at 878 (quoting Smith, supra note 106, at 370).
108. Seidenfeld & Akre, supra note 86, at 749-50.
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Indeed, the doctrinal inconsistencies in the Court's standing juris-
prudence are difficult to deny and relate to both injury-in-fact and re-
dressability. In Lyons, for example, the Court eschewed a rigid applica-
tion of the standing doctrine, but in Massachusetts, the Court based
standing on largely prospective harm that resulted from agency inac-
tion.109 The Court has also relaxed its view of redressability in certain
contexts. In Vander Jagt, the Court correctly held that congressional
plaintiffs have standing to commence suit in cases where "legislative re-
dress is not available or a private plaintiff would likely not qualify for
standing."110 If elected representatives have standing in such cases, why
are citizens prohibited from challenging laws in similar circumstances,
particularly where constitutional rights are implicated? The answer, of
course, is that they should not be-although they are under the current
standing framework.111
At the very least, the Court's jurisprudence supports a nuanced and
process-oriented approach to standing that would balance deference to
the coordinate branches with the r cognition that judicial intervention is
sometimes necessary to protect fundamental constitutional rights.112 The
standing doctrine should not be applied in a manner that renders courts
"blind to what must be necessarily known to every intelligent person,"
' 113
and unsympathetic the realistic threat of future harm.114 Achieving this
objective depends in substantial part on acknowledging that the standing
doctrine does not consistently advance the primary justification on which
it rests-separation of powers.115
109. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (holding that the EPA "has
offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause
or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore 'arbitrary, capricious.., or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law"'); Calabrese, supra note 76, at 1471 (discussing the
Court's decision in Laidlaw and stating that "harm can be cognizable when it begins to be
feared, even if this occurs before it is imminent").
110. Delker, supra note 99, at 367 (discussing Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm'n,
656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 39, at 1184 (criticizing the injury-in-fact prong on
the grounds that it "require[s] more certainty than that offered by the laws of elementary
economics" and proof of harm that is "very likely to be redressed") (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)).
112. See generally Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, Or the
Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283 (2012) (discussing the im-
portance of substantive due process in guarding against arbitrary state action).
113. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 510 (2009) (quoting In re Wo Lee,
26 F. 471,475 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (internal quotations omitted).
114. See id. at 506.
115. See Shane Palmer, Comment, No Legs to Stand On: Article III Injury and Offi-
cial Proponents of State Voter Initiatives, 62 UCLA L. REv. 1056, 1066 (2015) (stating
that the standing doctrine "helps to prevent the courts from infringing on the constitution-
al domains of the legislative and executive branches").
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In theory, by invoking the standing doctrine, courts relegate "many
crucial decisions to the political processes,"'1 16 and defer to the coordinate
branches' lawmaking power.17 As Justice Scalia states, "standing is a
crucial and inseparable element of [separation of powers] whose disre-
gard will inevitably produce, as it has in the past few decades-an over
judicialization of the process of self-governance."'1 8 Without the stand-
116. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974); see,
e.g., Ryan McManus, Note, Sitting in Congress and Standing in Court: How Presidential
Signing Statements Open the Door to Legislator Lawsuits, 48 B.C. L. REv. 739, 745
(2007) (stating that the court "describe[s] standing as focused on limiting the federal
courts to their proper role in a democratic society"); see also Elliott, The Functions of
Standing, supra note 66, at 516 (explaining that the Court has relied on the standing doc-
trine to limit the judiciary's involvement "to cases possessing the requisite concrete ad-
versity for judicial resolution, avoiding questions better answered by
the political branches, and resisting Congress's effort to conscript the courts in its battles
with the executive branch").
117. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (explaining that, in light of the "overriding and time-
honored concern about keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper constitutional
sphere, we must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of [an] im-
portant dispute and to 'settle' it for the sake of convenience and efficiency") (quoting
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997)); Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576
("Vindicating thepublic interest (including the public interest in Government observance
of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive."). In
Lujan, the Court stated:
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in
ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be
discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional
role of the Third Branch-one of the essential elements that identifies those
"Cases" and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts rather than of
the political branches.
Id.
118. Scalia, supra note 26, at 881; Brown, supra note 65, at 238-39; see also John G.
Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L.J. 1219, 1229 (1993);
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEx. L. REv. 73, 99 (2007). Professor
Siegel explains as follows:
An individual or minority group suffering injury from illegal action of
the political branches of government needs the protection of the unelected and
not politically accountable Judiciary, but the majority does not need protection
from itself The majority can take care of itself using majoritarian processes,
and therefore majoritarian processes should determine not only the content of
the laws but the degree of enforcement the laws receive, so long as only the
rights of the majority are affected. If the government chooses to let a legal re-
quirement lapse into desuetude, and the populace does not compel compliance
through political pressure, that should be fine, so long as no one is distinctively
injured. For the Judiciary to step in where the government perhaps acts illegal-
ly but injures no one, or where it injures so widespread a group of people that
no one is distinctively injured (a "generalized grievance," in Supreme Court
parlance), would, Justice Scalia maintains, put the Judiciary in a role it would
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ing doctrine, the courts would have the power to "decide abstract ques-
tions of wide public significance even though other governmental institu-
tions may be more competent to address the questions."119
2. The Standing Doctrine Does Not Further Separation of Powers
Principles
It is difficult to understand how separation-of-powers principles are
furthered when the political process is not a realistic avenue by which lit-
igants can remedy legally cognizable harms.121 In such circumstances,
this approach does not advance the separation of powers; it concentrates
power in the legislative and executive branches, and it immunizes elected
officials from the consequences of arbitrary conduct.121 Consequently, in
certain contexts, the judiciary, consistent with its Article III reviewing
power,122 should have to decide issues that Congress, for whatever rea-
probably not execute well. The Judiciary's insulation
from political accountability, he says, renders it an appropriate body to protect
individuals from the people but inappropriate to decide what is good for all the
people.
Id.
119. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 500; see also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222; Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923) (to decide cases involving generalized grievances
"would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over
the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we
do not possess"); Flickinger, supra note 92, at 387-88. Professor Flickinger described
the purposes of standing as follows:
First, they [standing requirements] limit judicial review. This often seems like
an end in itself among members of the Rehnquist Court, and it is particularly
attractive in cases, such as redistricting disputes, that concern the political pro-
cess. Second, standing rules increase judicial efficiency by discouraging the
filing of lawsuits by those with mere ideological interests ....
Third, standing is said to improve judicial decisions by requiring the presence
of plaintiffs with personal interests, who are likely to present he highest quality
advocacy. Fourth, standing rules rest on a fairness principle that those who
have insufficient interests in a controversy should not be allowed to enforce the
rights of those who may have deliberately chosen not to assert them.
Id.
120. See Scalia, supra note 26, at 894 (stating that the goal of the standing doctrine is
to prevent litigants from "remov[ing a] matter from the political process and plac[ing] it
in the courts").
121. See, e.g., Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179, 228 (2011)
(noting that "[s]tanding might also apply differently in constitutional and statutory con-
texts, either because courts should be more keen to avoid deciding constitutional issues,
or, conversely, because the federal courts play a special role in enforcing
the Constitution").
122. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124
YALE L.J. 1836, 1906 (2015). Professor Metzger explains as follows:
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son, cannot. After all, "the purpose of the judiciary is to correct unlawful
conduct by the executive and legislature,'2 and in doing so, "the judici-
ary does not impermissibly interfere with the function of those branches
because those branches have no authority to engage in unlawful acts.124
The separation-of-powers justification is further undermined when
one considers the fact that, where Congress creates standing via statute,
the Court has permitted plaintiffs to sue who would otherwise satisfy the
traditional requirements.12 5 In Lujan, Justice Scalia stated:
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural rights" are
special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests can assert hat right without meeting all
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under
our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction
of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing
agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even
though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will
cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam
will not be completed for many years.126
Article III standing requirements do not justify judicial refusal to recognize a
duty to supervise. In fact, recognition of such a duty to supervise could allevi-
ate rather than intensify the standing concerns associated with systemic chal-
lenges. These concerns typically center on lack of the requisite injury or causa-
tion relationship, with the Court at times skeptical that the systemic problem
caused the discrete or particular injuries plaintiffs assert. Yet if the injury at is-
sue is being subjected to inadequately supervised governmental action, then
systemic improvements in supervision would be directly correlated to the
claimed injury. Moreover, recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise can
help to establish that being subjected to inadequately supervised action is, on its
own, a constitutionally cognizable harm.
Id.
123. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REv. 275, 318 (2008).
124. Id.
125. See Seidenfeld & Akre, supra note 86, at 762, 768 (stating that "congressional
creation of general procedural rights, without more, can affect the judicial inquiry into
standing," and that Congress's "superior institutional capacity to recognize harms and,
relatedly, the procedures warranted to protect against those harms"); see also Brown, su-
pra note 65, at 244 (stating that Congress often creates standing via statute and authorizes
citizen suits "as a supplement o the executive's enforcement apparatus").
126. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (emphasis added); see
also Seidenfeld & Akre, supra note 86, at 774 ("[T]he concreteness of likely harms and
the causal chains between statutory violations and those harms .... ).
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3. The Standing Doctrine Harms Politically Powerless Groups
The primary inquiry in standing cases is whether the litigant "pre-
sents a controversy that for structural reasons [the Court] think[s] is bet-
ter resolved in the political branches."' 2 7 The Court has interpreted this
principle in a manner that roots standing "immovably in the text of Arti-
cle 11" 128 and imposes rigid criteria without accounting for legislative
inertia or partisan entrenchment.129 Moreover, as stated above, the Court
has relied largely on separation-of-powers principles without explaining
in depth why judicial review would compromise the coordinate branch-
es' lawmaking powers.
Unfortunately, this approach has led courts to apply the standing
doctrine in a manner that harms politically powerless groups and that
compromises the Court's role in protecting fundamental rights. As one
court has noted:
127. Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 66, at 486. Professor Elliott ex-
plains:
As a means of pursuing the general pro-democracy goal, then, standing proves
a poor tool. It may well be worthwhile to dismiss cases involving generalized
grievances, because plaintiffs in those cases have no common-sense stake be-
yond that any of us has and thus might properly be channeled away from the
courts and into the political process. The problem is that the benefit of the doc-
trine here is nugatory: "It is never hard to find an adequately Hohfeldi-
an plaintiff to raise the issues." Thus, standing may find the few true nega-
tives---cases where standing does not exist-but it will also allow many false
positives---cases where standing exists, yet under the pro-democracy tenet
should be resolved by the political branches, not the courts.
Id. (quoting Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281, 1305 (1976)).
128. Id. at 515.
129. See, e.g., Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Over-
sight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1434-35 (2008). The judiciary's role, in part, is
to address issues that cannot be resolved through the political process due to self-
interested and entrenched majorities:
The Framers were particularly attuned to the connection between tyranny and
the organization of power; indeed, as Madison declared, the "accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Constitution provid-
ed the solution to the problem of tyranny by establishing institutions
and processes that have as their organizing theme the disentrenchment of pow-
er. A host of mechanisms, including the separation of powers, bicameralism,
and federalism serve to disperse and disentrench governmental power.




It would be far better... for... great social and political problems to
be resolved in the political arena by other branches of government.
But these are social and political problems which seem at times to de-
fy such resolution. In such situations, under our system, the judiciary
must bear a hand and accept its responsibility to assist in the solution
where constitutional rights hang in the balance. 
130
Indeed, courts stand as guardians of constitutional rights and pos-
sess both the authority and independence to redress harms that result
from arbitrary laws:
[M]any issues will not be addressed by the political branches because
largenumbers of people are harmed but only minimally; environmen-
tal problems, for example, are frequently characterized by widespread
but mild injuries that are unlikely to lead to political mobilization.
Precisely because the courts are less democratic than the executive
and legislative branches, they should make sure not to worsen the an-. • 131
tidemocratic aspects of the political branches.
Simply put, the standing doctrine is "ill-suited to the functions it
has been asked to serve,"'132 and creates a governance structure that "sys-
tematically favor[s] the powerful over the powerless."'133 As one scholar
explains, "the anti-democratic critique rings hollow when those whose
interests are most at stake in the enforcement of socio-economic rights
(typically people of limited means) lack equal or meaningful access to
democratic processes.'34
Some might argue that the Court's approach to statutory standing is
consistent with the separation-of-powers argument because it reflects
deference to Congress's judgment.135 But if the Court is willing to allow
Congress to confer standing where it would not otherwise exist, why did
the Court invalidate the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County when the
130. Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967).
131. Heather Elliott, The Misfit Between the Standing Doctrine and Its Purposes, 34-
SPG ADMiN. & REG. L. NEWS 13, 14 (2009) [hereinafter Elliott, The Misfit Between].
132. Id.
133. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis,
82 B.U. L. REv. 301, 304 (2002).
134. Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-
Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REv. 923, 937
(2011).
135. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 91, at 107-108 (summarizing Justice Scalia's de-
fense of the standing doctrine on separation of powers grounds).
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Senate voted 98-0 in favor of re-authorization? Justice Scalia suggested,
perhaps correctly, that Congress was institutionally incapable of resolv-
ing the issue, and such incapability necessitates judicial intervention.136
Put differently, it is not inconsistent to defer to Congress's decision to
create standing, and to grant standing where Congress is institutionally
incapable of providing a remedy. Doing so preserves the Court's role as
an independent check on the coordinate branches and protects politically
powerless groups who would otherwise have no means by which to en-
force constitutional rights.
Consequently, in circumstances where redress through the legisla-
ture is not available, and where the plaintiff is within the class of indi-
viduals who are or who will be harmed by the challenged law, courts
should intervene. Judicial intervention in these circumstances would not
lead to charges of overreaching because concerns regarding separation of
powers are virtually non-existent. Rather, judicial intervention in this
context would be consistent with the courts' authority to say "what the
law is" when the coordinate branches cannot, and to protect constitution-
al rights from arbitrary laws.137 Additionally, concerns regarding separa-
tion of powers do not arise in the context of whether a litigant can satisfy
traditional standing requirements.138 Instead, such issues arise concern-
ing "the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated,"139
including whether "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be present-
ed... in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."'4
As such, the Court should place substantial weight on the suitability and
workability of resolving a specific issue through the judicial rather than
the legislative process. In doing so, the Court should, at least in some
cases, place less emphasis on whether a litigant has strictly satisfied the
traditional standing requirements. This would more appropriately bal-
ance the judiciary's power to correct constitutional wrongs with the leg-
islature's lawmaking power and avoid deferring to the legislative process
when it would result in substantial harm to politically powerless groups.
Currently, however, although the Court has displayed a willingness
in some circumstances to relax the traditional standing requirements, it
has not set forth a coherent framework that would guide lower courts on
when a departure from the injury-in-fact and redressability would be
warranted. For example, in Massachusetts the Court "relax[ed] the re-
136. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 47-48.
137. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that the judiciary has
the power to "say what the law is").
138. See Simard, supra note 24, at 312 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101
(1968)).
139. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 313-14.
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dressability standard in an unspecified manner not tied in any logical
way to the procedural right it found in the statute [conferring stand-
ing]. 141 Put simply, "what remains ambiguous is the degree to which
the redressability and immediacy requirements are relaxed,"142 and what
remains invisible is any workable test to determine the circumstances
under which these requirements should be relaxed. 
143
III. BACK TO SHELBY COuNTY." A PRAGMATIC STANDING TEST
In some circumstances, the standing doctrine strips the courts of
their role as guardians of constitutional freedoms, particularly for politi-
cally powerless and traditionally disadvantaged groups. One scholar ex-
plains as follows:
[T]he Constitution protects the minority from undesired governmen-
tal acts, but if enforcement is relegated to the political process, repre-
sentative bodies will condone unconstitutional actions whenever a
majority of voters favor them. The very purpose of a constitution is to
protect fundamental principles from the political process. This pur-
pose is frustrated when constitutional questions are left to the majori-
ty.
144
Thus, when faced with arbitrary legislative action or inaction, judi-
cial intervention "is not only appropriate but essential" to protect citi-
zens' constitutional rights.145  In other words, the Court can-and
should-have a meaningful role in resolving constitutional questions
when, as Justice Scalia stated in Shelby County, elected officials lack the
political will to do so. When the Court applies the standing doctrine, re-
gardless of legislative inertia or entrenchment,146 some citizens are left
with rights without remedies and a government that is neither unaccount-
able nor responsive to its citizens.
147
In Shelby County, Justice Scalia cited a deficiency in the political
process as a reason to eschew deference to Congress, and this may have
been the reason why the Court invalidates portions of the Voting Rights
141. Seidenfeld & Akre, supra note 86, at 766.
142. Id. at 764.
143. Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 66, at 483-485.
144. Dana S. Treister, Note, Standing to Sue the Government: Are Separation of
Powers Principles Really Being Served?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 689, 708 (1994).
145. Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, Standing Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of
Powers, State Courts, and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 767 (2006) (quoting
Londonderry School Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 996 (N.H. 2006)).
146. See Dawood, supra note 129, at 1435-36.
147. See Treister, supra note 144, at 691 (stating that "[w]hen citizens accuse
the government of not enforcing the law, courts should serve as neutral arbitrators to pro-
tect the rights of citizens because such claims are not adequately remedied by the political
process").
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Act despite overwhelming support for re-authorization. Noting that
"they [Senators] are going to lose votes if they do not reenact the Voting
Rights Act," 148 and suggesting that the Act would be "reenacted in perpe-
tuity unless... unless a court can say it does not comport with the Con-
stitution,"149 Justice Scalia recognized the necessity for judicial interven-
tion in this situation.150 The same principle should be applied when
politically powerless citizens challenge a law's constitutionality, yet dis-
cover that redress through the democratic process is nothing but an exer-
cise in futility. When citizens, who are within the class of individuals
that will be subject to the harm and have no recourse through the legisla-
tive process, have asserted a legally cognizable harm, denying such citi-
zens standing will risk making the arbitrary acts of government immune
to challenge-and insulate elected representatives from accountability."'
In other words, deferring to the legislative process as a matter of
course disregards the fact that elected representatives can make it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to change laws that violate constitutional protec-
tions:
The major obstacle in addressing allegedly unconstitutional acts
through the political process is that system's frequent ineffective-
ness. In theory, elected officials, responsible to -their constituents,
will lose their office if they act illegally or in a fashion contrary to the
will of the majority; in practice, this democratic ideal often goes un-
realized. Elected representatives are rarely receptive to citizens' alle-
gations of unlawful conduct. In fact, when citizens assert unconstitu-
tional conduct, the government often presents a vigorous defense of
its actions. Thus, even with a perfectly functioning political process,
148. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 48.
149. Id. Justice Scalia further stated:
This Court doesn't like to get involved in-in racial questions such as this one.
It's something that can be left-left to Congress. The problem here, however,
is suggested by the comment I made earlier, that the initial enactment of this
legislation in a-in a time when the need for it was so much more abundantly
clear was-in the Senate, there-it was double-digits against it. And that was
only a 5-year term. Then, it is reenacted 5 years later, again for a 5-year term.
Double-digits against it in the Senate. Then it was reenacted for 7 years. Sin-
gle digits against it. Then enacted for 25 years .... And this last enactment,
not a single vote in the Senate against it. And the House is pretty much the
same. Now, I don't think that's attributable to the fact that it is so much clearer
now that we need this.
Id. at 46-47.
150. Seeid. at47.
151. See Treister, supra note 144, at 691 (arguing that "the current doctrine creates a




citizens would have to wait for an election to try and stem unlawful
behavior.152
If the Court rigidly applies the standing doctrine in these situations,
redressability in any branch of government is effectively foreclosed. For
these reasons, the Court should strive "to determine in what circumstanc-
es, consonant with the character and proper functioning of the federal
courts, such suits should be permitted."'1 53 To do so, the Court must de-
velop a practical standing framework that accounts for these realities to
avoid continuing injustices, promote greater accountability, and affirm
the judiciary's role as a check on the coordinate branches' lawmaking
power.
154
A. A Three-Part Test Focusing on the Lack of Redressability in the
Political Process
The first principle that should guide application of the standing doc-
trine is that it should be invoked in a manner that avoids the "potentially
disastrous consequences of turning away the politically powerless in the
name of democracy."'55  Indeed, holding that a matter is best resolved
through the legislative process, without examining whether recourse is
available through that process, "comes at the expense of the public
152. Id. at 707-708 (internal citations omitted). The standing doctrine not only fails
to promote the Court's role in enforcing individual rights; the doctrine fails to further the
very principles used to justify its existence:
Moreover, the Supreme Court's willingness to leave claims against the gov-
ernment to the political process is based on three false
tions. First, separation of powers principles do not, as the Court suggests, dic-
tate a reduced judicial role, rather they require active judicial review of
governmental actions. Judicial review provides a check on the accumulation of
inordinate power in any one branch. Second, plaintiffs who present generalized
grievances cannot sufficiently remedy their claims through the political pro-
cess. Their injuries are sufficiently concrete-even if shared with all citizens-
to require protection by the courts. Third, the Court is wrong in suggesting that
the antimajoritarian nature of the federal judiciary makes it incapable of ruling
on generalized grievances. Once a court recognizes a plaintiffs objection to
improper government behavior as an injury, it becomes clear that federal judges
are well qualified to adjudicate these claims. Even if the court's role in such
cases is viewed as enforcing the will of the majority, the judicial branch still
provides plaintiffs with the most effective remedy.
Id. at 724-25.
153. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968)).
154. David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete
Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 808, 824 (2004) ("Judicial in-
terference with political decisions arises not from grants of standing but from orders is-
sued correcting constitutional and statutory violations.").
155. Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 66, at 516.
2016]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
good... to promote private interests... [and] to serve their [legislators]
own political interests."
156
This article proposes a three-part test that will confer standing on
individuals where: (1) an issue cannot realistically be resolved through
the legislative process; (2) a litigant makes a prima facie showing that a
law violates a fundamental constitutional right; and (3) the issue(s) ena-
ble courts to develop workable rules to guide lower courts, legislators,
and law enforcement officials. This test would bring cohesiveness to the
Court's standing jurisprudence and increase access to the courts without
opening the floodgates to scores of new lawsuits or undermining separa-
tion-of-powers principles.
1. A Matter Cannot Be Resolved through the Legislative Process
There are several reasons why some issues cannot be resolved
through the political process. The first is where, as Justice Scalia be-
lieved in Shelby County, it may be politically unpopular to do so.157 In
addition, individuals or groups may lack power or access to elected rep-
resentatives.158 In this situation, the standing doctrine's requirements,
coupled with the generalized grievance rule, make access to the courts
even more difficult. 159 To begin with, the generalized grievance rule
places too much emphasis on numerosity. As Professor Elliott notes, "it
is simply not the case that an issue affecting huge numbers of people will
necessarily be addressed by the political branches, even if people would
want it to be.,160 For example, in class-action lawsuits, where common-
ality of claims is a prerequisite to class certification,16 injuries may be
widespread and similar but are nonetheless direct, personal, and concrete
to every member of that class.162 As a result, the analysis should not turn
156. Teter, supra note 27, at 1445-46.
157 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 47-48.
158. See Nichol, Jr., supra note 133, at 304.
159. See Mark Gabel, Note, Generalized Grievances and Judicial Discretion, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1331, 1353 (2007) stating that
"[g]rounding generalized grievances doctrine in Article III and separation of powers con-
cerns, as the Court did in Lujan, restricts the ability of the federal courts to implement
public values").
160. Elliott, The Misfit Between, supra note 131, at 14.
161. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-51 (2011) (stating that, to be
certified as a class, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "there are questions of law or fact
common to the class") (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(2)).
162. Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 66, at 483. Professor Elliott ex-
plains as follows:
If standing is meant to divert into the political branches problems better solved
there, then its proper application should result in the dismissal of cases where
large numbers of plaintiffs share the same injury. The problem is that this use
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on the number of individuals harmed, but on whether the litigant is with-
in the class of individuals who have or will be harmed, whether the harm
is of the type that a statute or constitutional provision was designed to
safeguard, and whether the legislature is unwilling or unable to remedy
the alleged harm. Although standing ensures that the Court does not
"trample on Congress's legislative prerogatives,"163 it should not operate
to preclude judicial intervention when "Congress is essentially unable to
undertake these efforts." 164 In this way, the standing doctrine under-
mines, rather than strengthens, the democratic process, and diminishes,
rather than increases, the avenues by which citizens can have a voice in
governance.165
Finally, the traditional standing requirements can harm historically
disadvantaged groups. As the Court noted in United States v. Carolene
Products,166 discrimination "against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." 167 Stated differently, "[w]hen an identifiable social group has
been consistently and significantly underrepresented or in other ways ex-
cluded from the legislative process, traditional political proeesses cannot
be relied upon to protect that group."
168
[T]here is good reason to suspect that the standing doctrine has been
used to exacerbate existing injustices. When invoking separation-of-
powers concerns to deny justiciability, courts should be careful to
maintain access for those who cannot expect a fair hearing from
of standing does not make sense in the doctrine's own terms: the tripartite test
asks whether a plaintiff has suffered injury in fact. If the plaintiff is, in fact, in-
jured, it is irrelevant under that analysis whether many others share that same
injury. Indeed, if one considers contemporary mass tort and class action cases,
it becomes clear that federal courts must have jurisdiction over count-
less cases that involve widespread yet particularized harms.
Id.
163. Id. at 513.
164. Heather Elliott, Congress's Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L.
REv. 159, 161 (2011) [hereinafter Elliott, Congress's Inability].
165. See Treister, supra note 144, at 708 (noting that "the Constitution protects the
minority from undesired governmental acts, but if enforcement is relegated to the politi-
cal process, representative bodies will condone unconstitutional actions whenever a ma-
jority of voters favor them").
166. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
167. Id. at 152 n.4.
168. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1833, 1867 (1992) (quoting Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term -
Foreword- Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARv. L. REv. 80, 91 (1991)).
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the political branches. When invoking separation-of-powers concerns
to deny justiciability, courts should be careful to maintain access for
those who cannot expect a fair hearing from the political branches.
After all, the ultimate purpose of our Constitution's separation of
powers is to restrain arbitrary government action; it would
be oxymoronic to deny standing to a plaintiff who cannot gain access
to the political branches of government to redress arbitrary govern-
ment action. 
169
For this reason, when a racial or ethnic group has "experienced a
history of discrimination or must face a real danger of long-run exclu-
sion,"17 courts must intervene to guard the group from "unjustified se-
lective treatment, that is, discrimination.1 71 Absent judicial intervention,
the standing doctrine will lead to the worsening of already-existing legal
harms for disadvantaged and politically powerless groups.172 Otherwise,
"the power to trigger judicial review [will be] afforded most readily to
those who have traditionally enjoyed the greatest access to the processes
of democratic government."
1 73
Several factors should be considered when determining if an issue is
not amendable to resolution through the legislative process. These in-
clude, but are not limited to, the following circumstances:
Inaction. The legislature has failed to act over a prolonged
period of time despite credible evidence that a law infringes
on protected constitutional freedoms;
169. Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 66, at 512-13.
170. Issacharoff, supra note 168, at 1867.
171. Id.
172. See Nichol, Jr., supra note 133, at 305. Professor Nichol states as follows:
A standing doctrine that distorts constitutional litigation in favor of traditional
bases of economic and social authority has little to commend itself Such a
standard abandons comprehensible justifications for judicial intervention. It
excludes participants who already are often marginalized in the operations of
other branches of government. And, ironically, it fashions new tools to sustain
and augment inequality in a society that has allowed many of its central egali-
tarian aspirations to fade from national concern. Standing law is not only un-
successful; it is demonstrably harmful. In theory, as the Court has told us, the
Article III injury requirement assures the "proper-and properly limited-
role" of the federal courts in our system of government. In fact, however,






" Disproportionate Harm. The law in question disproportion-
ately affects politically powerless and disadvantaged
groups;
* Institutional Entrenchment. The legislature is dominated by
one political party that is unlikely or unwilling to make pol-
icy changes;
* Impracticality. Elected representatives are reticent to ad-
dress an issue due to actual or perceived political fallout (as
suggested during oral argument by Shelby County).
174
By applying these factors, the Court can relax its standing require-
ments in a narrow class of cases on the basis of necessity and utility. The
purpose is to ensure that cases are not dismissed for "'democratic rea-
sons' when the democratic branches are, in fact, unavailable to the plain-
tiff. ' 175 In this way, the Court can avoid applying the standing doctrine
in a manner that "systematically favor[s] the powerful over the power-
less,"176 and create a system that promotes the rule of law, accountability,
and equality.
2. A Litigant Makes a Prima Facie Showing that a Law Facially
Violates a Constitutional Right
Where, on the basis of a complaint, a litigant makes a prima facie
showing that a law violates a constitutional right, the Court should be
more willing to find standing, provided the litigant satisfies the non-
redressability and judicial suitability prongs. In Carolene Products, the
Court held that "there may be narrower scope for operation of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the Fourteenth."' 177 As Professor Elliott notes in discussing
Carolene Products, "the Court emphasized its role in assuring that hose
who are marginalized are not trampled on by the majority.
178
The Court has, at least in some cases, recognized that protection of
minority rights is a part of the judiciary's role. For example, the Court
has conferred standing in racial gerrymandering cases to invalidate redis-
174. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, 47-48.
175. Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 66, at 516.
176. Nichol, Jr., supra note 133, at 304.
177. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S: 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
178. Elliott, The Misfit Between, supra note 131, at 14.
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tricting plans that infringe on the fundamental right to vote.7 9 It has
done so despite the fact that "a harm is difficult to apply to any one indi-
vidual," 180 and "[t]he mere placement of an individual in one district in-
stead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others,"
' 181
In Shaw v. Reno,' 82 the Court articulated a principle of representational
harm by holding that the redistricting plan was "so extremely irregular
on its face that it rationally [could] be viewed only as an effort to segre-
gate the races for purposes of voting."' 83 In Miller v. Johnson,184 the
Court held that a valid claim exists whenever race is "the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number
of voters within or without a particular district."'85
In these cases, the Court has emphasized the severity of the consti-
tutional violation rather than the presence of concrete harm, noting that
racially-motivated redistricting plans marginalize certain racial
groups.186 As one commentator notes, racially-motivated redistricting
plans "threaten to undermine... representative democracy by signaling
to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than
their constituency as a whole., 187 Additionally, such plans are incon-
sistent with elected representatives' "constitutionally-rooted obligation to
work for the entire community,"188 and be "accountable to a community
identified by the 'constitutionally irrelevant criterion of race."1
89
At the same time, Court has not clarified whether the reasoning in
Miller and Shaw may apply to other contexts. As former Supreme Court
Justice David Souter stated in Bush v. Vera, 190 "a helpful statement of a
179. See Flickinger, supra note 92, at 382 ("[T]he use of race as the predominant fac-
tor in redistricting--even when used by the majority to provide additional minority repre-
sentation-is unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to further a compelling state inter-
est.").
180. Id. (noting that the harm "is only incidentally about individuals").
181. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 681-82 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
182. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
183. Id. at 642 (emphasis in original).
184. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
185. Id. at 916.
186. See Flickinger, supra note 92 at 388 (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)).
187. See id. at 394; see also Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Ger-
rymandering, 'Fair Representation,' and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 527, 533-34 (2003) (stating that racial gerrymandering "is said to 'corrupt
politics,' for, in its worst form, it 'condemns political groups to permanent minority status
almost regardless of their electoral strength or of changes in voter preferences"') (internal
citation omitted).
188. Id. at 394 (quoting Emily Calhoun, Shaw v. Reno: On the Borderline, 65 U. Co-
lo. L. Rev. 137, 141 (1993)) (internal quotations omitted).
189. Id. (quoting Calhoun, supra note 188, at 141).
190. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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Shaw claim still eludes this Court."1 91 Significantly, however, before the
Court decided Shaw, it "required evidence of substantial harm to an iden-
tifiable group of voters to justify any judicial displacement of these tradi-
tional districting principles."192 After Shaw, the Court shifted its focus to
the severity and pervasiveness of the constitutional deprivation:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in
common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncom-
fortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the percep-
tion that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live-
think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere
as impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions,
a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial block
voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to coun-
teract. 
193
Perhaps the most significant problem in cases involving racial ger-
rymandering is "is standing's redressability requirement.' 94 If, as the
Court suggested in Shaw and Miller, marginalization of minority voters
constitutes the harm to be remedied, then such harm "exists in tension
with the Voting Rights Act, the aim of which is to protect-and in many
cases enhance-minority voting strength."'95 Therefore, "as long as the
Voting Rights Act survives, legislatures must walk a fuzzy line between
compliance with the statute and the treatment of race as the predominant
consideration... [which] may be an unworkable distinction."' 96 The
concept of unworkability lies at the heart of why, in some situations, ju-
dicial intervention is necessary to preserve separation-of-powers princi-
ples, and to protect constitutional freedoms.97 For this reason, deference
to the legislature can, in some instances, contribute to arbitrary depriva-
tions of constitutional freedoms.
191. Id. at 1045 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1050.
193. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647-48.
194. Flickinger, supra note 92, at 402.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See generally Michael J. Teter, Gridlock Legislative Supremacy, and the Prob-
lem of Arbitrary Government Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2217, 2217 (2013) (stat-
ing "the Framers were concerned with preventing arbitrary governmental action. Grid-
lock not only makes the arbitrary exercise of governmental power more likely, but also
implicates a new concern: the problem of arbitrary inaction").
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3. The Issue(s) Enable that the Court to Develop Workable Rules
to Guide Lower Courts, Legislators, and other agencies of
Government
Although the Court should be mindful of separation-of-powers
principles, it should also focus on "offering clearer rules to the lower
courts."198 Importantly, "to provide clearer guidance for the lower courts,
and more transparently realize the separation-of-powers functions it
seeks to promote,"199 the Court should focus on the necessity and utility
of judicial intervention. A necessity-driven approach would involve a
consideration of whether the coordinate branches, for reasons such as
fear of voter disapproval, are unable to address matters that impact con-
stitutionally-protected rights, and on whether the Court's intervention
would yield a result that cannot be achieved legislatively.2°°
In conducting such an inquiry, the Court should consider whether
workable rules can be developed to guide lower courts and ensure re-
spect for the coordinate branches of government. This involve a consid-
eration of several factors, including whether: (1) the issue(s) constitutes
a question of law, and the resolution requires the interpretation of legal
text; (2) the subject matter is within Congress's enumerated powers and
therefore entrusted to the legislative process; (3) there is a reasonable
likelihood that the harm is reasonably likely to occur and will continue
occurring absent a legal remedy; and (4) the remedy (e.g., an injunction)
is one that the Court is institutionally suited to providing. Such factors
would avoid excessive judicial oversight over affairs properly left to the
legislature and acknowledge that the courts have an important role in
protecting constitutional rights and promoting a participatory democratic
process.
At bottom, this proposal has several benefits that will mitigate the
harsh and likely unintended consequences caused by applying the tradi-
tional standing requirements. Where elected representatives are unwilling
to address controversial issues litigants, citizens will have the means by
which to enforce constitutional rights and remedy legal harms. In doing
so, the Court can clarify its standing jurisprudence, provide guidance to
lower courts, and avoid the "uncertain and inconsistent application of the
198. See Elliott, The Functions of Standing, supra note 66, at 516-17 (emphasis add-
ed).
199. Id. at 459-60.
200. See Treister, supra note 144, at 707 (arguing that the problem with "addressing
allegedly unconstitutional acts through the political process is that system's frequent inef-
fectiveness. In theory, elected officials, responsible to their constituents, will lose their
office if they act illegally or in a fashion contrary to the will of the majority; in practice,
this democratic ideal often goes unrealized") (internal citations omitted).
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law among the regional courts of appeals and district courts.,201 Perhaps
most importantly, courts would be required to examine whether there is a
realistic possibility of redress through the legislative process, thus ensur-
ing that citizens are not defenseless be against the potentially arbitrary
exercise of government power and subject to a government that "system-
atically favor[s] the powerful over the powerless.20 2
B. Counterarguments
Some might criticize this approach to standing on the ground that it
would enable the judiciary to intervene in matters that should be resolved
through the democratic process.203 This argument lacks merit because
courts can use other methods, such as applying the abstention and politi-
cal question doctrines, to defer to the legislature in appropriate cases.2°4
201. Todd. J. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts
Cases: Percolation or Procrastination? 54 U. Prr. L. REv. 861, 864, 867 (1993). Some
scholars have advanced the concept of percolation, which advocates thorough considera-
tion of issues in the federal courts leads to better decisions from the Supreme Court, de-
spite the concern about "uncertain and inconsistent application of the law among the re-
gional courts of appeals and district courts." Professor Fallon states as follows:
[D]enying review of decisions that conflict with other decisions of Courts
of Appeals ... results in the federal law being enforced differently in different
parts of the country. What is a crime, an unfair labor practice or an unreasona-
ble search and seizure in one place is not a crime, unfair practice or illegal
search in another jurisdiction. Or citizens in one circuit do not pay the same
taxes that those in other circuits must pay. It may be that occasionally it would
be of use to leave a conflict unresolved in order to await the views of other
courts; but for the most part, the conflicts that we turn down are not in that cat-
egory, and they invite prompt resolution in this Court, which now is the only
forum that can provide nationwide uniformity.
Id. at 867 (quoting Intercircuit Panel of the United States Act: Hearings on S. 704 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.147-48 (1985)
(statement of A. Leo Levin, quoting Justice Byron White).
202. Nichol, Jr., supra note 133, at 304.
203. See Michael J. Wray, Still Standing? Citizen Suits, Justice Scalia's New Theory
of Standing and the Decision in Steel Company v. Citizens For a Better Environment, 8
S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 207, 214 (2000) (describing Justice Scalia's view of standing and ex-
plaining that "[i]n order to restrict courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protect-
ing individuals and minorities from the majority's will, the standing doctrine,
in Justice Scalia's opinion needed to be reformed to exclude the courts from the 'even
more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should function in
order to serve the interest of the majority itself") (emphasis in original) (quoting
Scalia, supra note 26, at 894).
204. See Siegel, supra note, 118, at 112.
The political question doctrine keeps courts away from certain issues altogeth-
er. It is not just a question of fussing about he precise circumstances in which
the courts can act. It represents a judgment that as to certain issues, our gov-
ernment will function best if the political branches operate without any judicial
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As Professor Elliott notes, "[a]n abstention doctrine should also permit
courts to consider the extent to which the case involves a question that is
better resolved in the political branches,2 °5 without the additional cost of
preventing citizens from seeking judicial remedies.
Moreover, a slightly expanded application of the standing doctrine
to a limited category of litigants (and cases) would further separation-of-
powers principles because it would ensure that the judiciary acts as an
independent check on the coordinate branches' lawmaking power. One
commentator states as follows:
By using judicial review to check the power of the executive branch-
es, and by attempting to divine congressional intent... judges are
exercising the role intended for the judiciary, that of insuring the le-
gitimacy of the action of the legislative and executive branches. Fur-
thermore, by reviewing executive action according to legislative in-
tent, the courts keep the executive branch from encroaching upon the
domain of the legislative branch. Thus, even in the more expansive
view ofjudicial review, separation of powers plays a central role.
206
control at all. Of course, as to any particular issue, one might agree or disagree
with that judgment, but plainly a purpose is served by freeing
the political branches from judicial review in areas where judicial intervention
would do more harm than good.
Id.
205. Elliott, The Misfit Between, supra note 131, at 14; see also Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Why Abstention is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinction Between 'Legitimate'
and 'Illegitimate' Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking, 107 Nw. U. L. REv.
847, 848-49 (2013). The most frequently cited abstention doctrines are Pullman and
Younger Abstention. Professor Fallon describes these doctrines as follows:
Under Pullman, federal courts will initially decline to exercise jurisdiction over
cases in which plaintiffs present sensitive federal constitutional claims that the
resolution of a difficult state law issue might moot or alter. Instead, federal
courts will wait for state courts to resolve the state law issues that might make
the resolution of federal constitutional claims unnecessary. The Young-
er doctrine takes its name from Younger v. Harris, in which the Supreme Court
held that federal courts must virtually always abstain from adjudicating suits
seeking injunctions against pending state criminal proceedings. Subsequent
cases have extended Younger abstention to encompass suits for injunctions
against a broader array of state judicial and quasi-judicial proceed-
ings, including some in which neither a state nor its officials appeared as par-
ties.
Id.
206. Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion: Standing at the Fore-
front ofJudicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1548, 1608-09 (1993)).
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Some might question why, even in the face of legislative inertia,
207
courts can be trusted to resolve difficult legal questions. This argu
ment misses the mark. First, the Court should decide legal questions that
are suited for judicial review and that result in workable rules to guide
20
lower courts, regardless of the outcome of any given case.08 In other
words, this test speaks to ensuring fairer processes, not favorable out-
comes. As Professor Issacharoff states, an "individual or a group should
be allowed to participate in political decisionmaking regardless of
whether it will make any difference to the result.
209
Others may claim this proposal would open the floodgates to litiga-
tion and unduly burden the federal courts.21° Such an argument fails to
account for the substantial burden that this test places on litigants. In-
deed, access to the courts would only slightly increase for a discrete class
of litigants who can make a prima facie case that a challenged law vio-
lates a constitutional right. The additional requirements-the unavailabil-
ity of redress in the legislature and the workability of a judicial resolu-
tion-would ensure that only meritorious cases presenting issues
particularly suitable for judicial review would be heard.
The upshot is that a relatively small but significant number of liti-
gants would gain access the courts. In doing so, courts would strike to
protect politically powerless and traditionally disadvantaged groups who
are vulnerable to the abuses of entrenched majority rule or the motives of
self-interested political actors. By the same token, courts would not con-
fer standing on litigants simply because they believe a law is unconstitu-
207. See generally Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy, and Judicial
Interpretation: The Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REv. 585, 594 (2005) (de-
scribing the views of James B. Thayer, and stating that "when the non-elected judiciary
failed to defer to the policy choices of those agencies-failed to restrain their use ofjudi-
cial review to negate those policies-the judges were thwarting the workings
of democracy").
208. See generally Jonathan K. Van Patten, Making Sense of Bush v. Gore, 47 S.D. L.
REV. 32, 32-33 (2002) (summarizing the harsh criticism directed at the Supreme Court
after its decision in Bush v. Gore).
209. Issacharoff, supra note 168, at 1867 (quoting Lea Brilmayer, Caro-
lene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the Insider-Outsider, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1313
(1986)) (emphasis added). To be sure, the standard advocated here only governs access
to the courts. It does not seek to advance a specific ideology or method of constitutional
interpretation, such as living constitutionalism. See, e.g., Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts
About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 855 (2011) (ex-
plaining that "the meaning of the constitution is dynamic, capable of changing in re-
sponse to changing conditions in society"); see generally William H. Rehnquist, The No-
tion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693, 695 (1976) (giving insight into the
application of the "living Constitution" doctrine).
210. Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes, Forest, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Cir-
cuit Split Regarding Standing in Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13
U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 175, 190 (2006) ("One of the central functional concerns is over
whether a low standing threshold will open the floodgates for litigants.").
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tional, assert vague allegations of harm, or claim that redress through the
legislative process, while possible, would be more difficult (but not im-
possible) to achieve. As a result, courts would still respect separation-of-
powers principles, yet provide an avenue by which to safeguard funda-
mental constitutional rights.
Ultimately, because most constitutional rights "can be infringed by
legislative inaction,' 211 courts have a duty to intervene where such inac-
tion [or arbitrary action] deprives citizens of the rights to which they are
constitutionally entitled. When arbitrary laws are "the very source of the
constitutional violation,, 212  deference to the legislature "allows
that violation to persist"21 3and can threaten "democratic legitimacy.,214
For these reasons, although courts should be concerned about "politi-
cal capital and legitimacy, they cannot do so too strongly without radical-
ly changing (or abandoning) the meaning and function of an independent
judiciary.,215 That duty is to ensure that all citizens possess rights and
remedies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court should modify the standing doctrine in some contexts for
the same reason that it did in Shelby County where it invalidated two
provisions of the Voting Rights Act: the legislature cannot and will not
fix the problem.216 No legal doctrine should be applied without examin-
ing whether elected representatives are capable of remedying specific
harms and accounting for the relative unfairness in democratic govern-
ance. 2 17 When the traditional standing requirements are rigidly applied
without considering these factors, the Court undermines the separation of
powers and prevents sound judicial decision-making. In essence, rigid
application of the standing doctrine sends a message to litigants that they
have "come to the wrong branch of govermnent, even though no other
branch is capable of addressing the crux of her claim., 218 That message
should not be tolerated in a democratic society where fundamental con-
stitutional rights provide the foundation for individual liberty, and the ju-
diciary safeguards those rights against arbitrary deprivation.
211. Elder, supra note 145, at 767.
212. Id. at767.
213. Id. at 767-68.
214. Teter, supra note 27, at 1488.
215. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in
an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 415 (2011).
216. Elliott, Congress's Inability, supra note 164, at 177-78 (noting that "[s]ome
contend that standing doctrine cannot be fixed and should instead be abandoned altogeth-
er").
217. See Roederer, supra note 30, at 665-66.
218. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 215, at 413.
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The Court's jurisprudence should implicitly acknowledge that elect-
ed representatives sometimes act in self-interested ways. The nature of
democratic governance means that elected representatives will, at least
part of the time, make decisions to garner popularity with voters, in-
crease the likelihood of reelection, and build entrenched majorities. For
the same reason, elected officials may be reticent to address politically
unpopular issues or vote to enact or re-authorize laws that raise serious
constitutional questions. Whether through action or inaction, the result is
the same, and the remedy can only come from one branch: the judiciary.
Unfortunately, by applying the standing doctrine, courts can, wit-
tingly or not, concentrate power in the legislative branch and give it the
power not only to make laws but to insulate itself from the constitutional
constraints on its lawmaking power. Such application of the standing
doctrine can result in a political process that eschews accountability and
transparency and embraces a system of democratic governance for the
privileged at the expense of the powerless. Part of the judiciary's role is
to prevent abuses of the political process, and to protect individual rights
against dysfunction in the political process. Sometimes democracy is
enhanced through undemocratic means, and if federalism is to "in-
crease[] opportunit[ies] for citizen involvement in democratic process-
19219es, citizens must know that rights are not without remedies, and that
their status under the law is equal. Simply put, when the legislature can-
not adequately address an issue or remedy a legal harm, the judiciary
should.
219. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the 'Passive Virtues': Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1915 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
458 (1991)).
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